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45TH CoNGRESS,} HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
2d Session.

Ex. Doc.
{ No. 79.

THE ABANDONMENT OF .CERTAIN :MILITARY POSTS.

LETTER
FROM

THE SECRETARY OF WAR,
.

CONCERNING

The abandonment of certain military posts.

APRIL

20, 1878.-Referred to the Committee on Militar:v Affairs and ordered to be
printed.
•

WAR DEPAR'r.MENT,
Washington Oity, Ap1·il lD, 1878.
The Secretary of War has the honor to transmit to the House of Representatives, for the information of the Committee on :Military Affairs,
in response to a letter from the chairman of said committee, copies of
reports from the commanding generals of military divisions and departments, stating what military posts within the limits of their respective
commands can be abandoHed with advantage to the service.
The General of the Army submits the reports, with recommendation
that they be transmitted t~ the Bouse as a partial answer to the inquiry
of the l\lilitary Committee, and adds: ''Before taking any definite actiou
I advise some delay, because the occupation of some of the posts recommended to be vacated and disposed of were first occupied aud still continue to be occupied at the instance of the Indian Bureau, or to give a
sensA of security to the inhabitants in the vicinity. The Secretar.r of
War has experienced that, whenever we attempt to vacate military
posts for reasons purely military, members of Congress often ask for
delay or non-action. Before making any large sacrifice, all interests
should be consulted. I approve, however, in general terms of tile se,-eral recommendations."
In order that all who are interested in the matter may be ad ,·ised of
the action contemplated, it is respectfully recommended that this document be printed.
GEO. W. McCRARY,
Secretary of lVar.
The SPEAKER, Rouse of Representatives.
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Copies of 'reports of dit·ision an(l department commanders concerning military posts 'Within the limits of their respectit•e commands which can be
abandoned with advantage to the sen.,ice, in reply to circular letter OJ
January 17, 1878, from headq'ltarters of the Army.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, January 27, 1878.
GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following reply to your
communication of the 17th instant:
I recommend that the posts of Forts Sully and Rice, in the Department
of Dakota, be broken up. They haV"e, so far as I can see, fulfilled all
the objects for which they were built, an<l the troops can be quartered
at otber points without any addiUona1 expense. The posts of Abercrombie and Seward were abandoned dnring tbe past year. Tbe temporary posts at tbe New Red Cloud aud New Spotted Tail agencies are
entirely dependent for their permanency upon the permanency of the
said agencies. If they are removed to other localities, these p0sts will
be abanrloned.
In the Department of the Platte, I recommend the abandonment of
Forts Bartsuff and Bridger, Oamp Stambaugh and Nortll Platte Station.
These posts have fulfilled the purposeE: for which the.y were erected,
and are 110 longer of vital necessity, and the troops that now occupy
tbem can be quartered at otl1er posts without any additional expense to
tbe government. I think that Camp Sheridan should also he abandoned,
but will recommend that it be allowed to remain until about the 1st of
June next, when we can judge better what course to pursue in regard
to it.
.
In the Department of the Missouri, I recommetul that Fort~ Larned,
Garland, Union, Selden, and Craig be abandoned. I think that these

posts have also f1:1lfilled tbe purposes for which th(jy were established,
and the troops now stationed at thPm can be quartered at other places
\\ ithout increasing tbe expense. I am of the opinion that in about
another year or within righteen months Forts BayR, Wallace, and
Lyon can also be dispensed with, but the time has not yet arrh·ed for
.giving them up.
In the Department of Texas, I recommend the abandonment of Forts
Richardson and Griffin, as I think these posts haV"e also fulfilled the
conditions which called for their establishment, and the garrisons can
be stationed at other posts without inV"olvi11g additional expense.
I have the honor to inclose herewith the replies of the department
commanders in this di'Vision to the inquiries contained in JOUr letter of
the 17th instant.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
P. H. SHERIDAN,

Limdenant· General.
Brig. Gen. E. D. TowNSEND,

Adjutant.General, Washington, D. 0.

HEADQUAR'l'ERS DEPARTMEN'l' OF DAKO'J'A,
Saint Paul, JJiinn., January 22, 1878.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledgf'. the Ieceipt of your letter of
January 17, 1878, calling upon me to report what posts in this department may be abandoned with adV"antage to tbe public service.
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In reply. to it, I have the honor to inform you that, in my judgment,
Forts Rice and Sully can be given up with decided ad vantage to the
service. Fort Wee is upon the right bank of the Missouri River, twentyfive miles below Fort Abraham Lincoln, and twenty-five miles above
Standing Rock agency. Since the construction of these last-named posts,
its only possible use ha~ been to furnish winter qnarters for mounted
troops. In summer the place bas been an in cum bra nee, for it bas been
nece~sary to send infantry there to hol<l it whenever the cavalry has
taken the field. In consequence of the construction of the new posts on
the Yellowstone, Rice is no longer needed for shelter. It has been a
cavalry post; but should it be maintained as such, new stables would
be required. I would, therefore, abandon it, and build three, or perhaps
four, sets of stables for cavalr.v at Standing Rock, at which place there are
spare quarters for officers an<l men. These stables could be built clle<-tply
of logs, or perhaps more cheaply still of lnm ber from the buildings at
Fort Rice. I, therefore, recommend that from the best of the lumber in
the buildings at Rice sufficient be taken to bnild four stables at Standing Rock; that the doors., windows, and blinds be taken from all the
buildings au<l sent to neigh boring posts; and that the remainder of the
lumber in the buildings be sol<l. This lumber is not of sufficient value
to find a market as lumber, but will make good fnel for steam boats.
Fort Sully, a few years since, was an important post, and Cheyenne
agency was a dependency upon it. I;ast year the post at Cheyenne was
greatly enlarged, barracks ha\ring been built there for a regiment of
infantry. It is now the important post in that region. The two posts
are but. seven miles dh;tant from each other, and therefore Sully is useless. Tue new buildings at Cheyenne were hastily and \ery cheaply
built; they need impro,·ement~ which are essential to their stability, and
also enlargements and additions. I therefore recommend that Sully be
dismantled; that the doors, ulinds, windows, and the lumber be sent to
Cheyenne; the valuable portions of the lumber to be used in construction and repairs, the remainder of it to be issue<l as fuel. I also recom·
mend that tlJe militar,y resen~ation at Sully be added to the Indian
reservation established on the left bank of the Missouri by executive
order. This last recommendation I consider of great importance.
Should it not be done, the opportunity would be given to illicit traders
and other border vaga.bonds to intrn<le themselves into the midst of the
Indian camps, and tile whole purpose for which the executive reservation in question was established would be defeated.
I respectfully i!:lvite attention to the fact that three posts in this department, viz, Forts Abercrombie, Ripley, aud Seward, have been
abandoned. within the last year. 1 think no other post in the department can be safely abandoned at present.
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
ALFRED H. TERRY,
Brigadier- General Commanding.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL

u. s. ARMY,

Wash-ington, D. G.
(Through headquarters Military Division of the 1\iissouri.)

HEADQU.AR'.rERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,

Omaha, Nebr., January 24, 1878.
SIR: I have the hon or to acknowledge the receipt of your communication, dated January 17,1878, in which I am requested to commuuicate
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my views as to what military posts within the limits of this department
can be abandoned with advantage to the service, and as to the proper
disposition to be made of them.
In reply, I respectfully recommend the abandonment and sale of Forts
Bridger and Hartsufl', and the post at North Platte. While no military
necessity now exists for troops at Fort Fred Steele, Fort Landers, Fort
McPherson, and Sydney Barracks, yet as these are cheap places for the
stationing of troops, and as they may be necessary in future for the
quartering of such additional troops as military necessity in this section
may render necessary, I recommend that they may be retained at present. It is my belief that if the promise to the Sioux In(lians to permit
the movement of their agencies away from the Missouri River in the
spring be made good, military posts will be required either at the present
location of Camp Sheridan and Uamp Robinson, or at the points where
t.he new Sioux agencies may be established. There is now a large amount
of building material and other public stores at these posts, and at present, I do not recommend their abandonment. Should it be decided that
posts be established in future at the places where the Sioux Indians may
be located, I would recommend their transfer to such places. All building material now at them can be transported to and used for the construction of the new posts with great advanta6e.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEORGE CROOK,
B ·rigadie't·- Gene·r al Unitecl Stcttes Anny, Commanding.
To the ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S . .A..,
Washington, D. C.
(Through office assistant adjutant-general United States Army, headquarters .Military Division .Missouri.)

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTl\iENT OF THE l\IISSOURI,
Fort Leavenworth, ]{ems., January 23, 1878.
GENERAL: In reply to your letter of the 17th instant, I have the lwnor
to state that at various times within the last five years I have recommended the relinquishment of several posts in this department, which,
in my opinion, are no longer needed for military purposes. The difficulty has been, and still is, that if abandoned there will be no shelter
for the troops which occupy them. A certain military force is needed
in this department for the demands made for protection against Indians,
and for other objects, and must accordingly be kept at some convenient
point in the department whence t1Jey can readily be sent to the points
threatened. Of course stations for these troops should be chosen fulfilling the above conditions, anu at the same time possessing, as far as
possible, the advantage of economy in maintaining them.
The larger the bodies of troops concentrated at any given point, the
less will be the cost of supplying them. VVhen to this fact is added
the great benefit in discipline and efficiency they are certain to derive
from concentration, it should seem t1Jat consolidation of posts ought to
be t.he policy of the War Department. · As before stated, the difficulty
of making a concentration lies in the want of s1Jelter at any of the
points which might be chosen.
At the time the numerous small posts, at present occupied, were establis1Jed, immediate local necessities and a condition of our relations
with the Indian tribes, not now existing, probably rendered the posting
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of troops in these localities necessary to the safety of the frontier settlers, and the overland ronte to Colorado and New Mexico.
These conditions are now quite changed, and the necessities of that
time no longer obtain; but to concentrate now and give up the small
posts no longer neeued, requires the building of new quarters at the
points selected for the concentration.
There is not, I suppose, the slightest donbt in the mind of any officer
of the Army that such concentration would be of immense benefit to the
Army in every way, and especially in the way of economy.
With the understanding, therefore, that shelter for the troops now at
the posts I shall refer to, will be provided at the posts I suggest shall
be maintained, I give a list of the military posts in this department
which, in my opinion, can be given up.
Forts Lyon, Wallace, Hays, Harker, and Larned on the plains west
of this place, and Forts Uraig, Selden, and McRae, in New Mexico.
The troops now occupying the first group to be concentrated here or
at Riley. The garrisons of the posts of the second group to be distributed to the other posts in New Mexico.
Fort Harker can be disposed of at any rate now, as there are no
troops there. Should these posts or any of them be given up, I recommend that the reservations be divided up and sold, and that the money
obtained for them be devoted to building, at the points to which these
garrisons are transferred. In this way much of the cost of quarters at
such points will be saved.
If it be not considered well to build quarters for the troops now occupying the posts to be given up, I have to say that the only posts which
can be abandoned now are Fort Harker, Kansas, and gradually Fort
Craig, New Mexico.
That my opinious on thiR subject may be fully known, I insert extracts from my annual report of 1871, in which the advantages of con·
solidating the many small posts into a few large ones are fully discussed,
both as a measure of economy and of general benefit otherwise to the
Army and tlJe government.
The buildings at nearly all the frontier posts now occupied by troops are very cheap
log or frame structures, pnt up hastily and for temporary occupation. They need constant repair to keep them in habitable condition, and will need more every year.
Every dollar spent on them, I consider, in my view of the future, a waste of money. I
do not doubt that the sums spent for repairs, would, in the course of four or five years,
amount to a sum sufficient to put up substantial new quarters at better points, and so
as to concentrate the troops where they would be more efficient for the service required
of them, and where they could be maintained at much less cost, and with great advantage to their discipline and morale. I do not think that any of the posts in this department and of New Mexico should have a garrison less than a regiment. The office
now imperfectly performed by numerous small and expensive posts could be better,
more cheaply, and more completely performed by movable camps established in the
neighborhood of the present small posts, during the summer season, the only time during which Indian hostilities on the plains may be expected or are indeed practicable.
I append what was said on this subject in my last report more fully that it is necessary to repeat it here.
The completion of the Kansas Pacific Railway to Denver, and the changed condition
of the Indians, both as to their location and relations with the military, have greatly
simplified the question of the number and position of military posts, ancl have, I think,
enabled us to determine, in most cases, with some degree of certainty, the location of
the permanent military posts in this department, and the military dispositions necessary for the fnture.
The railroad, traversing the department from east to west, furnishes cheap and rapid
communication, and puts most of the posts within easy reach of supplies. It becomes
practicable, therefore, to conduct military operations with facility over the larger part
of this department, to receive immediate intelligence, and to concentrate troops with
rapidity. It seems, therefore, more practicable now to defend the numerous exposed
points on the frontier from some large central posts, on or near the railroad, than it
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was in times past imperfectly to effect the same object by the establishmeut of numerous small posts.
The Indians on the southern reservations cannot reach the settlements exposed to
them in Kansas and Eastern Colorado without crossing, or very nearly approaching,
the line of the railroad where their appearance aud number can be rapidly communicated by telegraph, and the necessary force sent by rail. Small detachmeuts placed at
the important stations along the railroad, in proper defensi,·e buildings, easily protect
such stations until assistance telegraphed for can reach them.
The depredations of Indians on the settlements in Kansas and Colorado must of necessity be committed during the warm weather. There is no grass for animals on the
plaius in the winter, and the violent snow-storms and severe cold altogether prevent
the Indians from traversing tbem at that season.
Summer camps of cavalry or infantry sent out in the early spring to important
points from s )me large central posts accomplish all the objec . s to be expected from
small posts kept up all the year at the same poiuts, and I am satisfied that they can
accomplish these objects much more completely and at vastly less cost.
It may be safely asserted that the same number of troops stationed at a large post
can be subsisted at much ltss cost than would be incurred if they were distributed at a
number of small posts. The administrative machinery of a small post, the police, the
service in the quartermaster's and subsistence departments, and for daily extra duty,
are nearly as great as for a large post. 'I' he waste of supplies-a large item-is greater
wben issued in small quantities than in large. It will be apparent without detail that
the general statement as to expenses is well founded.
The esprit, the discipline, and efficiency of troops are greatly promoted by assembling
them in large bodies, equal at least to one regiment. Every officer knows this fact
well.
In the service on the frontier the want of men for active pursuit of Indians and
other military operations in the field has been severely felt, and this want has been
largely due to the distribution of the troops at small posts. With a thousand men
at one post, it is easy to put into the field on the shortest notice eight hundred and
fifty men. Distribute the thousand men to four small posts, and it will not be found
practicable to put into the field six hundred men.
If, therefore, the needed protection to settlements and routes of travel can be as
completely secured by a few large posts as by many small ones, three very important things can be accomplished: 1st, a large reduction of expense; 2d, better discipline and rnorale among the troops; 3d, the power to use much more of any giveu
force for field service.

In my own opinion, the only posts needed in that position of this
department east of New Mexico are Forts Sill, Reno, Elliott, and Camp
Supply, all in the Indian Territory, and Forts Leavenworth and Riley.
The four first-named posts entirely command all the reservation Indians south of the Arkansas River, and, if properly garrisoned, completely inclo~e the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Comanches, .Apaches,
Pawnees, and Osages on their reservations.
Fort Riley is located in a region which produces almost e\erything
needed for the subsistence of troops, which can be bou;: ht at a lower
price than in any other place in the West, except perhaps Leavenworth.
It is in an open country sufficiently wooded for necessary purposes, and
at the junction of two large streams, giving abundant running water at
all times. It bas a reservation of about twelve thousand acres, and is,
in every respect, an admirable place to concentrate at least one regiment of ca\alry, which, placed there with the means of rapid transit
westward, would fulfill every requirement of protection on the plains
better tllan wllen distributed among several small posts.
· Fort Leavenworth is the best poiut I know west of the Mississippi
for the concentration either of infantry or cavalry. It is central, and
communicates by rail in every direction and with every place where
troops may be needed.
Nowllere can troops be more cheaply subsisted or more easil~T supplied. With a regiment of ca\alry at Riley and two regiments of infantry here, or even one regiment, the posts of Larned, Hays, \Vallace,
Lyon, and Dodge can be given up, aud it is not too much, in my opinion, to sa~· that one-third the expense of subsisting such a force would
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be saved, whilst the service now performed would be better done and
the troops kept in all respects in a better state of efficiency and discipline.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. POPE,
Brvt. JJiajm·-General, U. S. A., Commanding.
Gen. E. D . TowNSEND,
Adjutant GeneTal United States Anny.
(Ti.Jrough lwadquarters Military Di,~ision of tbe Missouri.)

[Telegram.]

25.
at Ubicago, January 25, 1878.)

SAN AN'l'ONIO, TEXAS, (Receiw~d

To General R. 0. DRUM,
A.ssistani Adjutant. Generul, Ohicrtgo, Ill. :
Under previous recommendation, having been authorized to abandon
Forts Richardson and Griffin, and it being directed to reoccupy Fort
Quitman, which I still consider uunecessttry, I have no stations in the department which I think, with due regard for public interests, should be
abandoned.
ORU, Brigadier-General.
[Indorsement on telegram.]
CHICAGO, Ja.n uary 28, 1878.
General Ord was not ordered from tlJese headquarters to reoccupy
Quitman.
The order was to reoccupy it when, in the judgment of the department commander, it was deemed necessary to protect public interests.
P. H. SHERIDAN.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE ATLANTIC,

New York, April 12, 1878.
SIR: In further response to your circular letter of January 17, 1878,
requesting my views as to what militt:tr.v posts in my command could be
abandoned w1th advantage to the service, &c., I have now the honor to
report concerning those posts which are not now, and have not for some
time been, occupied by troops, but are in charge of ordnance-sergeants,
&c.
Da-vid's Island, New York Harbor, near New Rochelle, 11. Y.--It wets
used as a recruiting depot aml rendezvous for troops during tlle rebellion. It is a large fine island, and well suitable for such purposes, or for
a general hospital in time of war. Tben~ is no present uemand for it,
unless it is necessary for like purposes now or in the future. Tbe buildings have, with a few exceptions, been removed, and tbe island is in
charge of an agent.
Fort Standish, Plymouth, 1Uass.; Fort Andrews, Plymouth. ]IJ.ass.; Fort
Sewall, JJiarblehead, ]fass.-Tbese are temporary earthworks, erected for
coa~:~t defense during tbe rebellion.
So far as known here, tbe lands on
which they are located were deeded to the United States, and uo doubt
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the Engineer Department has the correct record. They might be useful in case of hostilities affecting our seaboard, as was anticipated during the rebellion.
The following are permanent works, and should, in my judgment, be
retained:
Fort Wood, New York Harbor, Bedloe's Island.
Fort Lafayette, New York Harbor, at the Narrows.
Fort at Sandy Hook, N .•J., eighteen miles from New York City.
Fort Griswold, Connecticut, east from New London.
Fort Montgomery, New York, Rouse's Point.
Fort Winthrop, Massachusetts, Governor's Island, Boston Harbor.
Fort Phrenix, harbor of New Bedford.
Fort at Clark's Point, near New Bedford.
Fort Constitution, New Hampshire; Goat Island, Portsmouth Harbor.
Fort 1\JcCleary, :Maine, Kittery Point.
Fort Scammel, Maine, House Island, Portland.
Fort Gorges, Maine, Portland Harbor.
Fort Knox, 1\laine, near Bucksport.
Fort Sullivan, Maine, Eastport.
No~l'E.-This is an old work. It would require very extensive fortifications to make it valuable in the defense of the waters of the harbor.
As its importance in this respect is understood to be undergoing the
consideration of the Engineer Corps, I make no recommendation concerning it.
Fort Topham, Maine, near Parker's Island.
Fort on Dutch Island, Rhode Island, west from Newport.
Fort Delaware, Delaware, Pea Patch Island, 42 miles below Philadelphia.
Fort Mifflin, Pennsylvania, Delaware River, near Philadelphia.
Fort Washington, Maryland, Potomac River, 14 miles below Washington.
Fort Carrol, Maryland, Patapsco River, below Baltimore.
Fort Macon, North Carolina, near Beaufort, North Carolina.
Fort Jefferson, Florida, Garden Key, Dry Tortugas.
Fort Taylor, Florida, southwest shore of island of Key West.
Fort Pickens, Florida, Santa Rosa Island, Pensacola Harbor.
Fort ·Marion, Florida, in Saint Augustine.
Fort Clinch, Florida, Amelia Island, near Fernandina.
Fort Pulaski, Georgia, Cockspur Island, 15 miles from Savannah.
Fort :Moultrie, South Carolina, Sullivan's Island, Charleston Harbor.
Fort Caswell, North Carolina, near Smithville.
Fort Jackson, Louisiana, west bank of Mississippi River, 70 miles below New Orleans.
Fort Saint Philip, Louisiana, east bank of Mississippi River, opposite
Fort Jackson.
Fort Macomb, T.Jouisiana, right bank of Chef Menteur Pass, 25 miles
from New Orleans.
Fort Livingstone, Lonisiau~, on Grand Terre Island, 25 miles from New
Orleans.
Fort Pike, Louisiana, on Island Les Petites Coquilles, entrance to
Lake Pontchartrain, 28 miles from New Orleans.
Fort Massachusetts, Mississippi, Ship Island, Gulf of Mexico.
Fort Gaines, Alabama, Dauphin Island, Mobile Bay.
Fort :Morgan, Alabama, Mobile Point, entrance of Mobile Bay.
I have already expressed my views, in letter of February 18, and in
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indorsements of February 25, 1878, as to the posts now garrisoned by
troops in the Departments of the East, South, and Gulf.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
Jlfajor- General, Commanding.
The ADJUT.AN'l'-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS DEP .ARTMENT OF THE E.AST,

February 18, 1878.
SIR: In reply to the circular-letter from the Adjutant-General's Office,
of January 17, 1878, requesting my views as to what military posts in
the Department of the East could be abandoned with advantage to the
service, and the proper dispoRition to ue made of such as can, and
stating that th(' Secretary of \Var bas under consideration the propriety
of reducing the number of military posts i_n the United States, I have
the honor to state as follows :
Fort Mackinac is only occupied at present as quarters for troops sent
there from the South and West, from time to time, for rest and recuperation, after serving in western and southern regions. If posts are used
for such purposes, however, the vicinity of the National Park, on that
island, would make it judicious that this post should be retained; but
except on these grounds, there seems to be no reason why it should not
be abandoned.
Fort Niagara is ·an important position, and should not be given up,
although in time of peace its occupation is not necessary.
Fort Ontario is a defensive position for the city of Oswego in time of
war. I do not, however, consider it of any great importance unless the
system should be adopted of protecting all such cities by works, and
there are now greater cities on the lakes which have no such protection.
Then, too, the location of this fort (since the modern extension of the city)
makes it probably a not Yery useful structure.
Madison Barracks at present seems to serve no important purpose save
as quarters for troops, and if not used in that connection could be turned
over to the charge of au ordnance-sergeant. There is the skeleton of a
navy-yard adjoining which may or may not be used in the future. Upon
that I think depends the propriety of retaining the post or not. The
buildings are of stone.
Plattsburgh Barracks is now only used as quarters for troops who
have served on southern stations, and are sent there for recuperation.
Carlisle Barracks furnishes excellent quarters for troops, but serves no
other purposes.
I ]}now of no reason for the retention of a command at Washington
arsenal any more than at any other arsenal.
In reference to the following posts in Department of the Bast, namely,
Forts Wayue, Gratiot, Brady, Porter, Preble, IndependeJH~e, Warren,
Adams, Trumbull, Hamilton, Wadsworth, Schuyler, 1\1.cHenry, Foote,
and Monroe, I consider that they occupy positions which cause their
retention to be a matter of wisdom; but of course they need not be garrisoned in time of peace, save in so far as we desire them as quarters
for troops not actually employed elsewhere.
·
In connection with this matter, it is well to say that all posts are bet-
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ter cared fur wheu garrisoued than when left in the care of ordnancesergeants or agents.
There are several posts in the department unoccupied or in charge of
ordnance-sergeants; a report concerning them will be mctde hereafter.
Very respectfully, your obedient sernwt,
By W. S. Haucock, major-general, commanding:
JAMES B. FRY,
Assistant .Adjutant-General.
The ADJUTANT-GENERAL oF THE AR::\IY,
·
lVashington, D. 0.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF,
New Orleans, Ln., JJ'ebruary 4, 1878.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your circularletter of January 17, desiring my views a~ to whctt military pt>:5ts within
the limits of ti1is department can he abandoned witn aclvautage to the
service, and as to the proper disposition to be made of such as can.
The only military posts now occupied iu this department are Jackson
Barracks and Baton Roug·e Barrack~, iu Louh;iana; LittleRock Barracks,
Arkansas; and Mount Veruon Barraeks, Alabama.
Of these, Little Hock, Baton Rouge, and Mount Vernon were arsenals, and never inteuded to be garrisoned by troops. During the war
and reconstruction times it was found necessary to make use of them,
and additional buildings were added to those formerly used as arsenals.
I know of nothing in the present condition ofafl'airs that renders their
longer occupation as military posts necessary. Jackson B~uracks, just
below New Orleans, should, in my opinion, be retained as a military
post, and a fun garrison kept there .
.As to the disposition to be made of those posts, if abandoned, I should
say the goverument ought to retaiu possession of them. All the buildings of any present value are brick or stone, and will deteriorate but
little each year. They would sell but for little now, and might eventually be of great value to the government. .An old non-commissioned
officer could be placed in charge of them, or 80me retired officer might
be very glad to take charge of them for the privilege of occupying quarters there. At all events, the preservation of the buildings can cost but
little, and in my opinion the government should not dispose of them.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
0. 0. AUGUR,
Brigadier- General, Commanding.
The ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF 1'HE ARMY,
Washington, D. C.
[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILI1'ARY DIVISIO~ OF 1'HE ATLANTIC,
New Orleans, La., llebruary 25, 1878.
Respectfully transmitted to the Adjutant-General of the Army.
In reference to the posts j u the Department of the Gulf, I may state,
in comment on the recommendations of the commander of the Department of the Gulf, that if Little Rock, Baton Rouge, and Mount Vernon
arsenals are no longer necessary as arsenal~, I see no pos-:;ible necessity
for their occupation by troops, save so far as they may furuisll quarters
for such as may for the time being· be not actively employed in active
serv-ice.

THE ABANDONMENT OF CERTAIN MILITARY POSTS.

11

If sold, these properties would not bring great prices at the present
time especially; and as the buildings are of durable material it would be
better to retain them, even if each should only be occupied by an ordnance-sergeant in charge. Some future service for them would no dl)ubt
be found.
If a system of regimental recruiting should be established in the future
as has been at time8 suggested, by districting the countr,y according to
the number of regiments in the service, these places would serve good
purposes for the permanent headquarters of such recruiting establishments, and together with others of like nature owned by the United
States would provide suitable and ample facilities at those for regimental
nurseries.
Jackson Barracks, near New Orleans, La., should be retained and a
garrison maintained there. It has served useful purposes in the collection
and distribution of troops during the :M exican war and on other occasions,
and if like events should transpire again similar services would be required of it. Besides, its occupation would maintain a garrison for the
several permanent defenses on the Gulf and around the passes leading
from the Gulf to New Orleans and the Mississippi River.
WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
]fajor- General, Omnmanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF 1'HE SOUTH,

Atlanta, Ga., January 29, 1878.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of letter of the 17th
instant, making inquiry as to what posts within the limits of this depart
ment can be abandoned with advantage to the service, and as to the
proper disposition to be made for such as can be abandoned, and to say
in reply that I am of opinion that the post of Newport Barracks, Kentucky, might be permanently abandoned, and should aban<lonment be
decided on, that the property-real estate-should, to avoid any further
expense for care and repairs, be sold as soon as authority therefor can
be had.
There seems, since the removal of the recruiting depot, to be no real
necessity for a permanent garrison there, and the ground is of too limited extent to make the retention of the post specially desirable for possible future use as a rendezvous for volunteer troops or militia.
At the time of the return to this department, in November last, of
the Eighteenth Infantry from Pennsylvania, I recommended that Newport Barracks, then vacant, be regarrisoned; but the reasons related to
convenience at the time; the two companies, with the officers, could, all
concerned, be more comfortably provided for there than at McPherson
Barracks, and the cost for supplies at Newport would be no more, certainly, an<l the expenses attendant on the reoccupation of the post no
greater than the additional expense for transportation of the companies
to Atlanta; in addition to which reasons was the consideration that a
smalli force would be at hand should further occasion arise requring
the presence of troops anywhere within easy reach of Newport.
The post of Chattanooga, Tenn., might now be abandoned without
special <letriment; but as the post is on government ground, I think it
would be advisable, with the force at preseut in the department, toretain it for the fiscal year, for which time bnt little expense for its maintenance will be required.
When abandone<l, the buildings, which are of little value, should be
sold.
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The ground pertains to the tract on which is the national cemetery at
that place.
·
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
THOS. H. HUGER,
Colonel Eighteenth Infantry,
Bvt. Brig. Gen. U. S. A., Commanding.
The ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY,

Washingtmz, ]). 0.,
(.Through headquarters Military Division of the Atlantic.)
[Indorsement. J

HEADQUARTERS :MILITARY DIVISION ATLANTIC,
New Orleans, La., February 25, 1878.
Respectfully transmitted to the Adjutant-General of the Army.
Newport Barracks might be abandoned, the space occupied being too
small for any great concentration of troops; yet it is one of the places
which would furnish suitable facilities for a regimental recruiting establishment, should that system be adopted in the future for procuring
recruits for the Regular Army, as has been frequently suggested.
In the mean time, with such views as to the future, an ordnance-sergeant might be placed in charge when it should be thought advisable
to remove the two companies of the Eighteenth Infantry, now there, to
Atlanta, Ga., where the headquarters of the regiment are stationed, or
elsewhere. The removal had better, probably, in such case, be made
about the close of the present fiscal year (June 30, 1878), when the supplies there would be about exhausted.
The present garrison was sent there for winter quarters, after the labor
riots of last summer. The property is of value-real estate, as well as
the material of the buildings. The walls of the buildings are generally
of brick. If sold, I presume a later period would be better than the
present.
Chattanooga can be abandoned at any time, in my opinion (the ground
on which it stands belongs to the national cemetery there), and only
the bmldings (of frame and not important) need be disposed of. The
troops (one company Eighteenth Infantry) might be transferred to
Atlanta, where the regimental headquarters are.
If these troops should be ordered to Atlanta or elsewhere for quarters
merely, the removal should be deferred, probably, until the present
supplies shall have been exhausted, say to end of present fiscal year
(June 30).
Atlanta furnishes quarters for a regiment, and as long as a regiment
of infantry is maintained for service in the Department of the South,
.Atlanta might be the point. Tbere is no other such place in this department offering the facilities for that number of troops. The buildings are of frame, and belong to the United States. They are built on
leased land, however, the rent of which is $4,000 a year and the taxes
(the latter not onerous).
We can abandon the post and remove the buildings in any year before
its expiration, by giving the owner of the land three months' notice of
such intention.
Years of rent expire about the 31st of October, I believe; but that
date is a matter of record in my office, as well as in the War Department.
I write this while absent from my headquarters, and not having access
to the papers in the case.
WINF'D S. HANCOCK,
~Major· General, Commanding.
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HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE PACIFIC
AND DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA,

San Francisco, Gal., JJ1arch 25, 1878.
SIR: In answer to your letter of January 17, 1878, communicating
the directions of the General of the Army that the division and department commanders should express their views as to what military posts
within the limits of their respective commands can be abandoned with
advantage to the service, and as to the proper disposition to be made of
such as can, I send herewith letters from the commanders of the Departments of the Columbia and Arizona, giving their views on the questions
submitted, and have myself to report as follows:
DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA

At the breaking out of the hostilities with the Nez PerC(~S under
Joseph, I caused the post of Camp Independence to be broken up and
left in charge of an agent of the Quartermaster's Department. I then
intenderl not to reoccupy this post, and had the public property withdrawn.
The post consists of buildings recently put up at a co~t of many thousands of dollars, and has two or three reservations of valuable land-one
for the post, and the others for grazing and wood.
Now that the completion of the Southern Pacific Railroad gives a
speedy access to the country in which Camp Independence is situated,
and the Indians have become harmless, I recommend the abandonment
of the post, and that the land be sold in small bodies, in such way as the
law may allow. The land, even without the buildings, is worth more
than the usual price of $1.25 per acre. The buildings will have to be sold
with tlle land.
This is the only post in this department I can at this time recommend
to be abandoned, unless it be McDermitt.
I am aware that the posts of Camps Halleck, J\lcDermitt, and Bidwell
have been thought to be out of position; and I am informed that au
effort was ineffectually made by my predecessor to break them up and
unite the troops at some central point near the railroad at Heno.
I concede that, were it.now an original question, I might recommend
a different place or places for the troops now stationed at these posts.
But having in view the recent failure to do so, I had put tlle quarters at
Halleck in good repair, at a cost of several thousand dollars, anc.l as ·it
is a healthy post I do not recommend it to be abanc.loned.
As to Bidwell, it has the great advantage of being healthy and being
one of the cheapest posts in the department. It is sufficiently near
Indians for troops to operate from in three directions.
In this connection I must ask attention to the reports of General Howard and the agents (Reinhart and Turner) of the Indian Department.
The latter, for reasons in which I do not concur, and which are set forth
in my letter to you of the date hereof, recommends that the posts of
Bidwell and McDermit be broken up, and the troops sent to Fort Klamath
and Camp Harney, on the Klamatll and J\Ialheur reservations. General
Howard, on the other band, recommends that Harney be broken up and
the troops be sent to Boise.
Camp J\1cDermit is on the mail-route from California and Nevada to
Idabo, and is useful in this connection merely. The cost of supplies is
great, particularly for wood and forage; yet the post was of importance
when the Nez Perce hostilities broke forth.
Still, if either of the posts are to be given up, I prefer to abandon this
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one, mainly because of its comparatb:e expense. If it is to be vacated,
it should be utterly dismantled, for, if not occupied, it would soon be
plundered of everything.
I do not know anythiug of Camp Harney, except from the reports of
General Howard. He was, during the Nez Perce affair, solicitous about
this post not being left weak-handed, and I sent troops from Bidwell to
re-enforce it. A portion of the quarters have been recently destroyed by
fire. If the Indian Bureau do not want the post on the reservation, I
concur with General Howard, and recommend its beiug given up, or
transferred to the Indian agent.
If it is to be abandoned, I recommend that Bid well be strengthened.
It is central as to Indians to the north, northwest, and northeast. It
is one of the cheapest posts for supplies we have.
This would give Klamath, Bid well, Boise, and Halleck, abandoning
Harney and McDermit.
In such case additional buildings would have to be put up at Boise
and Bid well.
Camp Gaston is still necessary, and I think of adding to it an additional company, till the question of the Indians on the Lower Klamath
and Trinity is settled.
DEPARTMENT OF THE COLUMBIA.

I have already spoken of one of th~ posts (Harn ey) in this department,
and I recomm end no other post be given up.
Fort Stevens, at the month of the Columbia, could be left in charge
of .the ordnance sergeant and a small guard from :Fort Canby. This I
would do now if there were any funds available for transporting the
troops.
General Howard refers to Fort Townsend, but there are many Indians in that vicinity. The post is healthy, bas accommodation for two
companies, and is easily supplied; and I do not recommend its being
gi\en up.
The other posts in this department are Vancouver, Walla Walla,
Lapwai, Oolville, and the new post at Creur d'Alene-all needed. The
last two are, by recent decision of the General of the Army, to be fourcompany posts.
DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA.

I concur in the main with the department commander's report, ex·
ceptFirst. As to Fort Yuma. This po~t I have already abandoned as a
station for troops, removing the garrison of this post and that of Independence to Benicia Barracks. There they are more economically supplied, and more healthy than at Yuma. The completion of the Southern
Pacific Railroad enables this to be done, as these troops can now be
se11t to Yuma on telegrHphic notice in time for any emergency. A small
guard is kept at tlJe post to protect the public property. I recommend
this to be continued. In any case, I recommend the retention of the
quartermaster's depot, and so much of the reservation as lies on the
left bank of the river where the depot is built.
Second. I do not recommend the abandonment of Mojave. It is in a
position whence troops will be available, is comparatively cheaply Rupplied by river, and the barracks and quarters have been recently rebuilt
and repaired.
I recommend the retention of Whipple, Verde, .McDowell, ..A. pache,
Bowie, and Thomas, and recommend the abandonment of Grant and
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Lowe11, provided a post be established on the Southern or Mexican frontier, either at Camp Hnachuca or some suitable place in that quarter,
and additions are made to the quarters at Thomas.
I have heretofore recommended a post in Southern Arizona, but without success; it was judged premature, and that it would be best to wait
for the construction of the railroad. But the same reasons that will
cam;;e posts to be established i n ·the northern portion of thi~ cJi vision,
ac;; at Spokane Fall~ and at Lemhi, just east of the di\Tision line, apply
with at least equal force to Southern Arizona. The building of the
railroad will be of advantage in the matter of administration, but the
post is needed witlJ rrference to tlJe frontier, which, it is to be hoped, is
fixed.
The need of this post will be seen to have commenced with the Gadsden purcha~e. Then Fort Buchanan was established, succeeded at intervals by Calabasas, Tubac. Urittend.en, Wallen, and now Huachuca.
This question has been and is still complicated by the difficulties in
getting a site not covered by a Spanish title, and one that is not unhealthy.
The present camp is furnished from the posts of Lowell and Grant,
which I recommend be discontinued, provided, as 1 said, the troops
there can be provided for at a new post south and at Camp Thomas.
The troops are needed but are not ad,Tantageously posted, either \Yith
respect to operations or military allmiuistration.
In 8a}ing this I beg it may be kept in mind that this thing of abandoning posts and establishing new ones has been going on constantly
evt>r since the Mexican war, and has been causeJ by the constantly
changing condition of our relations with the Indians as they are pressed
ami pushed from place to place by the intruding whites.
But the end of the Indian question is rapidly approaching, an(l in a
few years it will be a thing of the past.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
IRVIN 1\fcDO WELL,
1J1.aj. Gen., Commanding ~Mil. Div. Pac. and Dept. Gal.
The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A.,
Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE COLUMBIA,
Portland. Oreg., February 1, 1878.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication
of the 17th ultimo, relative to the propriety of reducing the number of
the military posts in this department.
I think the Malheur Indians could just about as well be controlled
from Fort Boise, by sufficient force, as from Camp Harney. This would
dispense with the poRt at Harney.
The temporary force at Mount Idalw should not be disturbed at present.
In case of great emergency anc1 absolute twcessity of great reduction,
which in my judgment does not now exist, the posts of Townsend, Canby,
and Stevens eould be evacuated allll placed in clwrge of ordnance-sergeants, the artillery companies being concentraterl in the vicinity of San
Francisco.
In any event, while the immigrants and Indians are restless and unsettled, it does not appear to me to be wise to diminish the force in tbis
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geographical department, and therefore, as the troops are quickly available where they are, at healthful posts, I would not advise a change in
the posts on the coast at present.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
0. 0. HOWARD,
Brigadier- General, Ommnanding.
The ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. 0., .
(Through Division Headquarters.)

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA,
Prescott, February 18, 1878.
SIR: In reply to your communication of January 17, asking for my
views as to what military posts within the limits of this department can
be abandoned with advantage to the service and as to the proper dis·
position to be made of those that can be, I have the honor to submit
the following:
I do not think that any of them can be abandoned with advantage in
a pecuniary Yiew. The posts, as now built, are only sufficient to quarter
the present number of troops in the department. To abandon a post
would necessitate tbe construction of new quarters elsewhere for the
troops that would come from the abandoned post.
In a military point of \iew, se\eral posts migllt be given up for the
purpose of concentration. The troops at Camp Lowell are not needed
there, and could. go to the camp in Huachuca Mountains; Camp Grant
could be abandoned and the troops sent to Camp Thomas; Camp Bowie
should remain until the few renegades that are still out can be disposed
of; Fort Whipple and Cawp Verde, being but forty miles apart, could
be united preferably at the former post; Camp l\lcDowell should be
continued as a protection to the Salt River settlements, so long as the
San Carlos reservation contains as many uncontrolled Iudiaus as are
now there; Camp 1\l~jave could l>e abantloued.
Fort Yuma should llave enough men to keep the post in repair, as it
may require to be occupied, as it command:-; a strategic position where a
navigable river enters foreigu tenitory. The concentrations suggested
will necessitate the building of additional quarters at the posts where
the troops are concentrated and iuvolve a large expense; for this reason
only, I do not recommend it.
Oamp Apache, on the vVhite l\lountain reservation, cannot soon be
given up.
·
In a few years, if the population continues to increase, the troops can
be withdrawn from most of the posts, as they will no louger l>e needed
against the Indians.
Very respectfully, your obedient senTant,
AUGUST V. KA.UTZ,
Colonel Eighth Infantry, B 'ot. lJtlaj. Gen. (assigned),
Commanding Department.
ADJU1'AN1'-GENERAL UNITED S1'A1'ES ARl\IY,
Washington, D. 0.,
(Through Headquarters l\lilitary Division Pacific and Department California.)
0

